May 31, 2016, marks the centenary of the Battle of Jutland, the only major naval engagement of the Great
War with two hundred and fifty combat ships involved. The British, as they say,
lost the battle but won the war. British losses in ships and men were double
those of the Germans but the German fleet stayed in port for the remainder of
the war and Germany returned to unrestrained submarine warfare which eventually
brought in the Americans.
Sea power had kept Great Britain safe and powerful for
centuries. The strategy was simple:
maintain a fleet stronger than the combined fleets of the next two navies. Only
when Kaiser Wilhelm decided German deserved a place in the sun did Britain find herself in an arms race. To realize her ambitions, Germany MUST have a
navy that could take on the British. The
British were just as determined that this was NOT going to happen. Robert K. Massie’s Dreadnought: Britain, Germany and the
Coming of the Great War is a very readable history of the decades
before the war, the rivalry between Britain and Germany as they race to build
Dreadnought class battleships and the events leading directly to the
declaration of war.
The following is a very rough summary of the excellent
Wikipedia article, link above. The
article printed out in 38 pages including 6 pages of footnotes, bibliography,
further reading suggestions and external links. The table lays out the numbers
of combat ships involved in the battle, (NOTE: German torpedo-boats are the
equivalent of British destroyers).
The Germans, anchored in Wilhelmshaven, knew they could not
beat the British in a full-on naval battle so they devised a strategy to draw British
ships, a few at a time, into a trap and whittle down the numbers. The plan was to send Hipper with a squadron
of five battlecruisers, six light cruisers, protected by 31 torpedo-boats, to
the Skagerrak Neck where the Baltic joins the North Sea between Denmark and Norway
to harass British shipping and any British patrols. This would bring British ships to the area in
response and Scheer, who would follow Hipper with the full might of the High
Seas Fleet, would catch them and dispose of them.
Except the British had the German code book and knew
something was cooking but did not know what. So Jellico sent Beatty out with a
squadron of six battlecruisers plus four fast battleships, protected by
destroyers, to scout the area and planned to meet up with him west of the
Skagerrak Neck with the remainder of the Grand Fleet.
Everyone set out May 30 for a rendezvous with fate.
Communications were primitive and trying to control and coordinate that many
ships was problematic at best. Flags
were still the main method of ship to ship communication (hence flagship). Beatty came into contact with Hipper about
1400 hours May 31st. He
should have had the advantage but the four battleships didn’t get the message
in time and ended up too far away to help immediately. As well, Beatty held fire for 10 minutes
after he came within range.
Beatty attacked and everything went to hell. The Germans found the range quickly and sank
the Indefatigable with all
hands. Hipper headed south towards Sheer’s
fleet, chased by Beatty in a running battle with damage on both sides but with
the Germans outshooting the Brits 4 to 1 and sinking the Queen Mary. All was going according to Scheer’s plan.
Beatty spotted Scheer’s vanguard, turned his ships around
and “got out of Dodge”, with the Germans in hot pursuit. He would lead them to
Jellicoe who had no idea they were there.
It seems he had asked British Intelligence for information and got the
right answer but had asked the wrong question.
On the way North, the four battleships which had caught up
by this time, acted as rearguard to the fleeing British battlecruisers. Hipper rejoined Scheer and Beatty rejoined
Jellicoe though not without some difficulty in maneuvering of ships and the
loss of Defense. Scheer had no idea
Jellicoe was at sea, never mind bearing down on him. It was a shock when the
Germans ran into the entire Grand Fleet. Scheer was now outnumbered and
outgunned.
Jellicoe wanted the Germans to the west of him so they would
be backlit by the setting sun and he managed to do so, though he lacked
information as to their exact whereabouts. The main battle was joined at 18:30
hours. It was Scheer’s turn to get out
of Dodge. Jellicoe managed to “cross the T” with Scheer’s battle line twice in
an hour while Scheer managed to escape extreme damage by two “battle about turn”
in the same time frame. (I have no idea
what this means but it sounded cool).
German ships took a pounding but no battleships on either
side were sunk. Wikipedia gives all the gory details as to who sunk who and when. Cruiser and destroyers were the big losers as
they swarmed around fighting each other and trying to torpedo the big ships. By
2100 hours it was dark and the Germans were able to break off and get away and
by 0500 June 1, they were safely on their way home.
Both sides claimed victory. And the arguments continue to
this day about Beatty’s communications and Jellicoe’s allowing the Germans to
get away in the dark.
One of the reasons that the German fleet escaped so lightly
was the defective nature of British armour piercing shells. The Germans were
using TNT which would detonate AFTER the shell had pierced the armour while the
British were still using Lyddite which would often detonate prematurely. The problem had been pointed out to the
Admiralty however nothing had been done about it, nor would the faulty shells
be replaced until April 1918. It was
ever thus.